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RETHINKING RAWLS'S THEORY OF LIBERTY
AND RIGHTS
JAMES

W.

NICKEL*

INTRODUCTION

Rawls's theory of justice gives a central place to the protection of
basic liberties, and the essays in Political Liberalism substantially
strengthen and enrich Rawls's account of how basic liberties and
rights are justified and delimited.1 Rawls's account of the justification
of liberties and rights is important not only to his own theory but also
to broader efforts to provide a philosophical framework for defending
human rights. My goals in this Article are to present an up-to-date
and accessible account of Rawls's theory of liberty, subject key parts
of that theory to evaluation and criticism, and to suggest alterations
and additions. My criticisms and suggestions for alterations will usually be "internal" in the sense that I try to defend them within the
Rawlsian framework.
There are four sections. The first examines and reconstructs
Rawls's list of basic liberties and rights. The second section evaluates
the adequacy of the scheme Rawls provides for justifying this list. The
third section deals with Rawls's account of how the basic liberties
should be interpreted and applied. And the final section suggests that
his conception of the person should contain more than just two "moral
powers."
I.

A

THEORY OF BASIC LIBERTIES

Let's begin with a short summary of Rawls's revised theory of
basic liberties. 2 Rawls holds that a central part of social justice is a
* Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder.
1. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) [hereinafter POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. The
"lectures" or chapters of most relevance to liberties and rights are: Lecture VIII, The Basic
Liberties and Their Priority,id. at 289; Lecture V, Priorityof Right and Ideas of the Good, id. at
173; and Lecture II, The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation, id. at 47. Also helpful in
understanding Rawls's recent views on liberty and rights is his recent essay, The Law of Peoples,
20 CRITICAL INOUIRY 36 (1993) [hereinafter The Law of Peoples].
2. Important discussions of Rawls's theory of liberty and rights include H.L.A. Hart, Rawls
on Liberty and Its Priority, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 534 (1973), reprinted in READING RAWLS 230
(Norman Daniels ed., 1975); Norman Bowie, Equal Basic Liberty for All, in JOHN RAWLS' THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 110 (H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith eds., 1980); and REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTS 45-61 (1985).
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requirement that a "fully adequate" system of basic liberties be protected and given priority over (that is, never sacrificed to) social goods
such as prosperity, efficiency, and a high level of culture. 3 This re-

quirement, which Rawls refers to as his "first principle of justice,"
does not prescribe liberty in the abstract, but rather requires respect
for a select list of basic liberties derived from the bill of rights tradition. 4 This list includes freedom of conscience,5 association, to engage
in political activity, and from arbitrary arrest.
Rawls defends his proposed principles of justice by arguing that
they are central parts of fair terms of social cooperation for mutual
advantage between free and equal persons. In the "original position"
rational representatives of the members of society are asked to choose
principles of justice. 6 The veil of ignorance deprives these representa-

tives of information about themselves and their temporal and social
positions, thus assuring that they will choose principles that are impartial or fair in spite of the fact that they choose from self-interested
reasons. Since the veil of ignorance deprives them of much knowledge relevant to the choice and specification of liberties and rights,
the basic liberties that they choose must be rather abstract. They will
not be very clear about the exact scope of these liberties and rights

until they reach the constitutional stage-where they will create a
3. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 291; see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUS(1971) [hereinafter A THEORY OF JUSTICE].
4. A Theory of Justice gives the following formulation of the principles of justice:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a)
reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and
offices open to all.
A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 60. The first part of the second principle is often referred to as the "difference principle," and the second part as the "equal opportunity principle."
Although Rawls continues to refer to the first of these as his "first principle of justice," in
PoliticalLiberalism it is preceded by another principle concerned with basic needs:
the first principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may easily be preceded
by a lexically prior principle requiring that citizens' basic needs be met, at least insofar
as their being met is necessary for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to
exercise those rights and liberties.
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 7; see also id. at 228. With the introduction of a basic
needs principle, Rawls has four normative principles, with each item having lexical priority over
the items beneath it:
A. The basic needs principle;
B. The basic liberties and rights principle;
C. The equal opportunity principle;
D. The difference principle.
For purposes of this paper, I will continue to refer to the liberties and rights principle as the "first
principle."
5. See infra Section II for Rawls's complete list.
6. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 17-22.
TICE
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constitution that enumerates and protects the basic liberties and rights
and creates a democratic system of government.
Rawls claims that it is rational for people in the original position
to give the basic liberties a privileged place because these basic liberties are extremely valuable to anyone. In this respect, Rawls follows
the method of John Stuart Mill in Utilitarianism,where Mill demonstrates the great value of security to everyone and goes on to suggest
that security rights are at the center of justice. 7 Rawls differs from
Mill, however, in that a concern for fairness is built into the structure
of the choice situation.
To support claims about the great value of the basic liberties,
Rawls offers a theory of "primary goods." The theory of primary
goods has undergone substantial modification since the publication of
A Theory of Justice9 through the addition of a "political conception of
the person."' 10 This conception, which is derived from Rawls's root
idea of social cooperation between free and equal beings, suggests
that all persons need to develop and exercise two moral capacities."
The first of these (which Rawls calls the "first moral power") is the
capacity for a sense of justice, the capacity to accept and live by fair
terms of social cooperation. The "second moral power" is the ability
view
to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good-a personal
12
pursuit.
and
commitment
one's
of
of what values are worthy
Primary goods are social conditions and all-purpose means that
people generally must have in order successfully to form, revise, and
pursue their conceptions of the good and to develop and exercise a
sense of justice. Without freedom of association, for example, one
would be greatly handicapped in forming, revising, and pursuing a
personal conception of what is valuable, and in developing and exercising a sense of justice. Further, being denied freedom of association
would be a severe blow to one's self-respect-which is itself a primary
good.
Once society is able to provide for basic material needs, the basic
liberties are so valuable to persons concerned with developing and
7. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 41-63 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publishing 1979)
(1859).
8. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 75.
9. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3.
10. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 29.
11. Id. at 19, 81.
12. Rawls is also prepared to presuppose a third power, which is intellectual rather than
moral, comprised of human capacities for judgment, thought, and inference. This third power is
necessary for the exercise of the other two powers. Id.
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exercising the two moral powers, and so important to self-respect, that
the parties in the original position will decide that they must be equal
for all citizens (with a few qualifications) and that they must never be
sacrificed to secondary values such as greater prosperity or the ad13
vancement of scientific knowledge.
II.

THE LIST OF BASIC LIBERTIES AND RIGHTS

Rawls deals with the difficult question of which liberties are basic
by simply offering us a list-and a very imprecise one at that. Rawls
is not confident that the parties in the original position could generate
an adequate list, given the restraints on their knowledge. Instead,
Rawls suggests that in setting up the original position we, as political
theorists here and now, can construct such a list on the basis of our
historical knowledge of the liberties usually protected by the constitutions of democratic states and offer it to the parties as part of one of
the conceptions of justice they may choose.' 4 When Rawls proceeds
to construct a list of basic liberties by drawing on the successful constitutions of democratic states, he does so in a very schematic way. He
requires that the system of liberties be a "fully adequate scheme of
equal basic liberties," and identifies four categories of liberties or protections. 15 Although the content of these categories is illustrated,
much is left indeterminate.
We can begin by looking Table 1, which lists the basic liberties
given in Rawls's two books:
TABLE 1-THE BASIC LIBERTIES

A Theory of Justice16
1. liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought
2. political liberty (the right to vote
and to be eligible for public
office together with freedom of
speech and assembly)
13.

PoliticalLiberalism17
freedom of thought and liberty
of conscience
the political liberties and
freedom of association

See supra text accompanying note 3.

14. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 292-93.
15. Id. at 291.
16. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 61.
17. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 291.
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3. freedom of the person along with
freedoms specified by the liberty
the right to hold (personal)
and integrity of the person1 8
property
4. freedom from arbitrary arrest
the rights and liberties covered
and seizure as defined by the
by the rule of law
concept of the rule of law
Each of the numbered categories contains a family of liberties
and rights. The first category-freedom of thought and conscienceconcerns intellectual freedom or freedom of mind. It includes rights
protecting thought, belief, inquiry, expression, and association. The
second and fourth categories are familiar and widely used, and might
respectively be called "rights of political participation" and "due process rights." The third category is the most vague, and Rawls never
offers a comprehensive listing of its contents.
If one compares these four categories with historic and contemporary bills of rights, there are clearly important omissions. 19 I think
the most important of these are:
(1) rights to security (protections against wrongful killing, torture, rape, harm, and deprivation of property); and
(2) liberties in the area of family, lifestyle, and reproduction, including rights of privacy and (limited) control by parents of the rear20
ing and education of children.
These omitted liberties and rights are found in almost all contemporary national and international bills of rights and are no more controversial than the ones Rawls included. Thus, if the test is what we
find in successful constitutional bills of rights, these omitted liberties
and rights should be included. Ultimately, of course, one should attempt to provide justifications for each specific liberty or right and to
assess its importance or significance. I offer illustrative justifications
for many of the liberties and rights that I think should be added.
A.

The Omission of Security Rights

Security rights protect people against murder and unjustifiable
killing, torture, rape and other forms of sexual assault, violence, unjus18. Although Rawls fails to mention here the right to hold personal property, it has not
been dropped from the list of basic liberties. "[A]mong the basic liberties of the person is the
right to hold and have exclusive use of personal property." Id. at 298.
19. For an excellent collection of contemporary constitutions and bills of rights, see BASIC
DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN

RioHTs (Ian Brownlie ed., 2d ed. 1981).

20. I leave aside here the issue of welfare rights and the right to education. Rawls deals
with these under the basic needs principle, the equal opportunity principle, and the difference
principle. Also left aside is whether equality rights, such as rights to equal protection of the law
and freedom from discrimination should be included in the list.
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tifiable harm, and theft or unauthorized use of one's body, time, and
justifiably held assets. Although Rawls seems not to include security
rights in the first principle in A Theory of Justice, he does give related
duties explicit treatment elsewhere in that book. Duties "not to injure," "not to harm the innocent,"' 21 and "not to cause unnecessary
suffering" 22 are listed among the "natural" duties. Natural duties are
ones that do not arise from promises, contracts, roles, or the principle
'23
of fair play; they apply to us "without regard to our voluntary acts."
Including matters of security among the natural duties is unobjectionable, but it does not provide an adequate account of a government's responsibility to protect security, which is an important
dimension of fair terms of social cooperation. Hart suggested that
natural duties (such as the duty not to harm) are standards of conduct
for individuals, while principles of justice are standards for institutions.24 But since government officials and agencies often kill, torture,
and harm, we require security rights against them as well as against
individuals. Further, creating an effective system of protections of security rights through the criminal law is one of the most important
things that can be done to make possible the enjoyment of other
libery below). If those who would invade people's liberties and rights
are unrestrained in their ability to threaten death, harm, violence, and
loss of property, few if any liberties can be enjoyed. 25 Security rights,
like due process rights, are essential building blocks for a system of
liberty.
In works subsequent to A Theory of Justice, Rawls includes security rights under the "liberty" and "integrity" of the person. As we saw
earlier, in Political Liberalism, Rawls changed the description of the
third set of liberties from "freedom of the person" to "freedom and
integrity of the person. '26 And Rawls takes the "integrity of the person" to include "freedom from psychological oppression and physical
21. A THEORY
22. Id. at 114.

OF JUSTICE, supra

note 3, at 109.

23. Id.
24. Hart, supra note 2, at 245-46.

25. As Henry Shue put it:
No one can fully enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if someone can
credibly threaten him or her with murder, rape, beating, etc., when he or she tries to
enjoy the alleged right. Such threats to physical security are among the most serious
and-in much of the world-the most widespread hindrances to the enjoyment of any
right.
HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 21 (1980);
see also JUDITH JARViS THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS 212 (1990).
26. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 291.
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assault. ' 27 But bundling security rights together with basic liberties
makes for an oddly mixed category. Security rights are not directly
matters of liberty. 28 For example, having effective legal prohibitions
of and protections against murder is not directly a matter of being free
to engage in some particular kind of action.
It is hard to understand why Rawls does not give security rights
an explicit and separate place in the list of basic liberties. 29 The reason cannot be that security rights are not exactly liberties, because due
process rights-which are included-are not exactly liberties in precisely the same way. Nor can the reason be that Rawls does not want
to authorize limiting liberty for reasons of security, since he does explicitly authorize this. For example, Rawls says that "Liberty of conscience is limited . . .by the common interest in public order and
security.'"30

I believe that the best way for Rawls to treat security rights would
be to recognize them explicitly as a separate category of rights. This
would add further weight to Martin's contention that not all of the
basic liberties are really liberties. 31 Rawls seems to have recognized
this in PoliticalLiberation by redescribing the basic liberties as "basic
liberties and rights." 32 To provide for the justification and definition
of these rights, I believe there will need to be corresponding changes
in the primary goods. We should at least add to the list of social primary goods (1) the avoidance of premature death, (2) the avoidance
of the destruction of one's health and normal physical and mental
abilities, and (3) the avoidance of severe pain.33 Hobbes, who probably invented the idea of a primary good (or maybe it was the idea of a
27. John Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q.J. ECON. 633, 640 (1974). I am
grateful to Thomas Pogge for bringing this passage to my attention.
28. This is recognized by Rex Martin in Rawls and Rights, when he says that "although the
integrity of one's body may be described as a freedom from certain physical injuries or mutilations, it is not in fact a liberty, not principally something that the rightholder does or can do."
MARTIN, supra note 2, at 47. Martin goes on to suggest that Rawls's first principle should therefore be seen as covering "liberties" and "noninjuries." Id.
29. In his recent essay, The Law of Peoples, supra note 1, at 57, Rawls treats security as a
basic right. He includes "rights to means of subsistence and security (the right to life)" among
rights that should be recognized by both liberal and hierarchical societies. lIdat 52.
30. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 212.
31. MARTIN, supra note 2, at 47.
32. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 5.
33. One might try to justify security rights instrumentally-as Shue does-so as to avoid
introducing new primary goods in this area. But giving only instrumental justifications for security puts the cart before the horse. One's main reason for wanting to avoid being stabbed, say, is
not to avoid loss of liberty. It is to avoid pain, loss of health, and death.
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primary bad), took these to be the most central ones. 34 They are essential parts of most life plans, and are necessary to the development
and exercise of the two moral powers.
B. The Omission of Lifestyle Rights
Hart worried that there are important areas of individual liberty-"sexual freedom and the ability to use alcohol or drugs among
them"-that seem to have no place in Rawls's list. 35 A related worry
is that Rawls nowhere mentions (to my knowledge) rights of privacy
as falling under either "liberty of thought and conscience" or under
the "freedom of the person."
Contemporary bills of rights usually cover matters of lifestyle
with the following rights: (1) privacy-no arbitrary interference with
family, home, or correspondence; (2) freedom of association; (3) freedom of movement and residence, including the right to emigrate; 36 (4)
freedom to choose one's occupation; (5) freedom to marry and found
a family, including freedom from forced marriage; and (6) freedom to
choose the kind of education one's children receive (within limits).
Like Rawls's list, these bills do not address sexual freedom or the use
of alcohol and drugs. These six areas of liberty are extremely valuable, but I doubt that they cover everything that is important in the
area of lifestyle liberties.
One possible strategy for Rawls to use here would be to say that
these six specific liberties are all included in his third category, "liberty of the person," but to say that other liberties-including matters
of sexual freedom and the use of alcohol and drugs-should be dealt
with "structurally" rather than by enumeration in the list of basic liberties. The structural protection of liberties is an important topic and
this is a good place to pursue it briefly. Hundreds of liberties of considerable value cannot be enumerated in a list of basic liberties; that
would make such a list too long and dilute its impact. Consider the
liberty to wear very unusual clothing (for example, a Tarzan suit) as an
example of such a liberty. How can this liberty be protected structurally rather than by enumeration in a bill of rights?
First, this liberty is structurally protected by security rights.
When effectively implemented, these rights prevent citizens or offi34. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., MacMillan Publishing 1962)
(1651).
35. Hart, supra note 2, at 237.
36. Rawls endorses the right to emigrate in POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 222,
and The Law of Peoples, supra note 1, at 53.
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cials who dislike one's unusual attire from beating one up or threatening to do so. Second, this liberty is structurally protected by due
process rights. When effectively implemented, these rights prevent officials from using the power to arrest and imprison as a means to keep
people from wearing types of clothing they despise. Third, this liberty
is structurally protected by rights of political participation. These
rights enable those who wish to wear unusual clothing to use the political process, and appeals to the courts, to defeat governmental meastires and actions that would prevent them from doing so. Fourth, this
liberty is structurally protected by rights to freedom from discrimination which prevent citizens and officials from discriminating against
people on grounds that are irrelevant to the decision or allocation in
question. Thus, an employer could not fire an employee upon learning that the employee liked to dress up like Tarzan after working
hours.
Finally, this liberty is structurally protected in the Rawlsian
scheme by political liberalism with its commitments to tolerance, reasonable accommodation of diverse perspectives and lifestyles, and the
resolution of political disputes using processes of deliberation that rely
on principles of justice and standards of evidence that are in some
sense neutral between competing conceptions of the good. These elements of political liberalism will make it difficult or impossible to pass
laws forbidding the wearing of unusual clothing. (Here a legal liberty
to do A will primarily be the absence of a legal duty to refrain from
doing A.)
Whether a liberty should be protected structurally or by enumeration is often a difficult question. It may depend on how important
the liberty is, how threatened it is, and how definable the liberty is.
But only a fraction of the liberties that matter to people can be enumerated, so structural protection must be the normal mode of protection for liberties. Rawls's theory of liberty would be stronger if he had
been more explicit about this.
C. The Reconstructed List
I will conclude this section by describing how Rawls's list of basic
liberties and rights would look if my suggestions were followed:
1. Liberties of mind-These include liberties of belief, thought,
inquiry, communication, and association.
2. Liberties of the person-These include freedom of movement
and residence, encompassing the right to emigrate; freedom to
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choose and pursue an occupation, including freedom from
slavery; freedom of assembly; freedom of religious practice;
privacy; freedom to marry and found a family, including freedom from forced marriage; and freedom to choose the kind of
education one's children receive.
3. Politicalliberties-These include freedom of speech, press, as-

sembly, to petition government, organize political parties, conduct political campaigns, vote in fair and meaningful elections,
and serve in public office.
4. Security rights-These include protections against murder, tor-

ture, rape, and unjustifiable violence and harm.
5. Due process rights-These include rights against arbitrary
arrest and detention, against retroactive criminal laws, to

habeas corpus, a fair hearing or trial in civil and criminal matters, and a presumption of innocence and assistance of counsel
in criminal trials. These five categories provide all the types of
rights found in contemporary bills of rights except welfare and
37
equality rights.

III.

JUSTIFYING A SYSTEM OF LIBERTIES

A.

Starting Pointsfor Justification

As we saw earlier, Rawls's first step in justifying a basic liberty or
right is usually to show that it is a primary good. To defend special
protection or status for an enumerated list of liberties and rights one
usually tries to show that these liberties and rights are of special importance or value. 38 This step might be called "the importance test. ''39
37. In PoliticalLiberalism, Rawls effectively accepts welfare rights as fundamental by giving
the basic needs principle priority over the basic liberties and rights principle. See supra, note 4.
38. When Rawls says that liberties and rights are primary goods, this is often ambiguous.
The value of a liberty or right to A may come from (1) the doing or having of A, or (2) from
having secure normative protection of A. The difference between these, to use an analogy, is
like the difference between the value of having a house and the value of having insurance on that
house. Let's say that the first is the value of the object of a right, and that the second is the value
of having normativeprotection of that object. When Rawls says that a liberty or right is a primary
good, he often means that the object of that liberty or right is very valuable. The value of being
able to choose for oneself what to believe is what makes freedom of conscience valuable. But
when he suggests that equal basic rights and liberties are necessary to self-respect, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 319, he seems to mean that equal political and legal protectionsfor
liberties and rights are necessary for self-respect. (Political inequality in respect to such important protections is an insult to those with lesser protections.) It would be neater if Rawls could
always say that it is the objects of the basic liberties and rights that are primary goods, and then
argue that rights as moral and legal protections are means to the effective enjoyment of these.
39. For a discussion of the role of the importance test, see JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING
SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHrs 109-12 (1987).
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In Rawls's scheme a good can only pass the importance test by being
shown to be a primary good. Hence, Rawls needs a substantial and
plausible account of what makes a good primary.
In Political Liberalism Rawls has provided such an account by
introducing his political conception of the person, with its associated
idea of two moral powers. This conception of the person enriches the
theory of primary goods by showing the fundamental importance of
two areas of human activity (developing and exercising a sense of justice and forming, revising, and pursuing a conception of the good).
Classical natural law theories did the same job by identifying certain
human functions or roles as inherent in human nature and functioning
or in God's plan for humans. As part of his variety of liberalism,
Rawls wants his theory of the person to be one that is constructed for
political rather than "metaphysical" reasons, so he tries to derive his
conception of the person from the root idea of his theory: social coop40
eration for mutual advantage between free and equal persons.
It is a little misleading to describe developing and exercising a
sense of justice and forming and revising a conception of the good as
merely "powers" or "capacities." Rawls is concerned both with capacities and their exercise or use, and hence is concerned as much with
areas of action as with capacities. We arrive at the primary goods by
asking what social and institutional conditions are necessary for people to be able to develop these capacities and to use them in the ordinary circumstances of human life. Primary goods are to be identified
by asking "which things are generally necessary as social conditions
and all-purpose means to enable persons to pursue their determinate
conceptions of the good and to develop and exercise their two moral
'4 1
powers."
Freedom of movement, say, is a primary good because it is indispensable not only to the development of one's sense of justice and
conception of the good, but also to exercising one's conception of justice in relations with others and to revising and pursuing one's conception of the good. If one could not move about in order to meet with
others to protest injustices, work on institutional reform, or create and
sustain institutions designed to assist in the pursuit of a conception of
the good, the exercise of the two moral powers would be severely
cramped.
40. POLITICAL
41. Id. at 307.

LIBERALISM,

supra note 1, at 11-22.
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In A Theory of Justice Rawls says that the social primary goods
are "rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and
wealth," along with self-respect. 42 In Political Liberalism we are
given the following list: (a) "[t]he basic liberties"; (b) "[flreedom of
movement and free choice of occupation against a background of diverse opportunities"; (c) "[p]owers and prerogatives of office and positions of responsibility"; (d) "[i]ncome and wealth"; and (e) "[tihe
social bases of self-respect." 43
B.

The Justificatory Arguments

The justification of basic liberties and rights is a process that is
begun in the original position and (largely) completed in the constitutional stage. The differences between what may be assumed and
known in these two stages make for a certain awkwardness in the
presentation of Rawls's views, and if one only looks at the justificatory
arguments that Rawls offers to the parties in the original position the
full power of his theory is partially hidden. 4 To avoid this I am going
to deliberately blur the boundary between the original position and
the constitutional stage. The arguments I describe all come into play
in the justification of basic liberties and rights, but they do not all do
so in the original position.
Rawls uses three main lines of justification for liberties and rights.
The first approach, which he uses extensively because of its availability in the original position, argues that a particular liberty is necessary
to allow people to develop and exercise the capacity to form, revise,
and pursue a conception of the good (the second moral power), or to
allow individuals to attempt to realize their particular conceptions of
the good. Arguments of this first type pertain to what is necessary in
the pursuit of a good life.
The second approach proceeds in the same way in regard to the
first moral power. It argues that a particular liberty (for example, a
political liberty such as the right to vote) is necessary to allow people
to develop and put to use the capacity for a sense of justice. Argu42. A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 62.
43. POLnICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 308-09.
44. The main reason for this, according to Rawls, is that the assumption of the original
position that the parties are motivated only by self-interest prevents them from viewing the first
moral power (the capacity for a sense of justice) as anything more than a means to the realization of their ends, and thus from giving it the sort of weight that it will have once the principles
of justice are chosen. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 315. Thus Rawls's own presentation of his arguments is divided into those that could be given in the original position, id. at 30924, and those that can be given after the two principles of justice have been chosen; id at 334-40.
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ments of this second type pertain to what is necessary to develop and
apply a sense of justice.
The third approach, which is indirect, argues that some liberties
and rights (for example, due process rights) are instrumentally necessary to protecting and making secure liberties justified by a direct relation to the two moral powers. Due process rights are essential means
of making secure the freedoms of thought, conscience, speech, and
association. Arguments of this third type pertain to what is necessary
to the protection of other liberties and rights. The following are some
Rawlsian arguments falling under each of these headings.
1. Necessary in the Pursuit of a Good Life
Most of the arguments that Rawls gives for the basic liberties fall
under this heading. In several of them he gives a justification for freedom of conscience which he uses as a model or paradigm. 45 One familiar argument proceeds from the need to protect one's ability to
pursue and realize one's particular conception of the good. 46 According to Rawls, people may reasonably regard their liberty to follow
their own moral, religious, and philosophical views as "non-negotiable," as something that they will not take chances with. Indeed, Rawls
suggests that if one were willing to take the chance of being forced to
accept alien beliefs and commitments, this would show that one did
not really "know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction
was." 47 The parties in the original position do not know whether their
views will put them in the majority or minority, so if they opted to
leave to utilitarian deliberations or to majority rule the question of
whether freedom of belief would be enjoyed they would indeed be
taking chances with their consciences. Since it is reasonable to be very
cautious about things one regards as non-negotiable, the parties in the
original position will choose the most secure guarantee of freedom of
conscience that is available to them and part of a workable conception
45. I agree with Rex Martin's complaints about Rawls's constant reliance on freedom of
conscience as a model case. Martin describes it as a "clumsy device." MARTIN, supra note 2, at
51. I suggest below that it is unnecessary.
46. This argument and the two that follow are ones that Rawls envisions being given in the
original position. They all appeal to interests in being able to pursue, revise, and see the value of
one's determinate conception of the good. It is interesting to consider whether one could give an
adequate justification for the basic liberties and rights by appeal to only these interests, thus
avoiding any reference to the first moral power. If so, one might be tempted to say that the truly
fundamental interest is in having a good life. My own inclination is to move in the opposite
direction (as Rawls has), to have a richer rather than a leaner basis for justifying basic liberties
and rights.
47. POLrTCAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 311.
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of justice. The basic liberties provide the most secure guarantee of
freedom of conscience available in the original position, and hence
they would be chosen as part of the two principles of justice.
Another argument suggests that freedom of conscience is essential to revising one's beliefs, conception of the good, and way of life.
To revise one's present beliefs and way of life one must be free to try
out new ideas and commitments, and even to fall into error. Without
48
freedom of conscience one would lack this freedom.
A third argument focuses not on freedom of conscience but on
the system of basic liberties as a whole. It claims that without selfrespect, our ways of life and conceptions of the good are likely to
seem of little value and not worth pursuing. We may have a conception of the good, but lack the will to pursue it. For this reason, it is
rational to give great weight to how well a proposed principle of justice supports self-respect. Rawls claims that the two principles of justice, with their commitment to the public recognition of the basic
liberties of all, are "more effective than the other alternatives in encouraging and supporting the self-respect of citizens as equal
' '49
persons.
2.

Necessary to Develop and Apply a Sense of Justice

Rawls argues that the political liberties and freedom of thought
are social conditions necessary to the development and application of
the first moral power (the capacity for a sense of justice). 50 Rawls
does not elaborate this argument, but it is not hard to do so. People
will find it very difficult or impossible to develop and exercise their
moral capacities if they are denied freedom of thought and freedom of
political participation. One's sense of justice cannot be put to work
effectively in some of its most important areas of application without
knowledge of social institutions and problems. Thus the development
and exercise of these moral capacities requires significant areas of
freedom to think, question, imagine, inquire, discuss, experiment,
travel, organize, campaign, and vote. We see from this that the first
moral power can be used to support not only political liberties but
also liberties of mind and personal liberties.
Because Rawls mainly focuses on the kinds of justification available in the original position, he makes insufficient use-in my opin48. Id. at 313.
49. Id. at 319.
50. Id. at 335.
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ion-of justifications that appeal to the first moral power. He uses
this approach only to justify rights of political participation, particu51
larly freedom of speech.
3.

Necessary to Protect Other Liberties

Rawls justifies most basic liberties indirectly using two kinds of
arguments. First, a liberty can be "instrumental in preserving other
liberties."5 2 Rawls suggests that an instrumental justification applies
to the political liberties, but I think that due process rights would be a
better example. People cannot be free in their freedom of conscience
and association if officials who dislike their views and associates are
able to use the legal system, without the constraints imposed by due
process rights and the rule of law, to imprison them or deprive them
of their property. Security rights are another example. Few liberties
can be effectively enjoyed and implemented if others are able to use
plausible threats of violence to deter one from exercising those
liberties.
The second kind of instrumental justification is that some liberties protect procedures and processes that are essential to regulating
the basic structure as a whole.5 3 Here Rawls mentions the political
liberties. Democratic institutions, and the political liberties they presuppose, regulate and stabilize the various institutions needed to enjoy the basic liberties. The same is true of legal institutions, and the
due process rights they presuppose.
Under the severe constraints of the original position, only a few
liberties are justified directly; most liberties and rights are justified indirectly as essential means to the directly justified liberties. But the
weaker constraints of the constitutional stage allow more liberties and
rights to be justified directly, and hence indirect justifications play a
smaller but still very important role. For example, it was suggested
above that security rights and liberties of thought, conscience, communication, inquiry, association, and movement could be justified directly by appeal to the first moral power.
Rawls often implies that there is a distinctive kind of justification
for each liberty, so that some liberties will be entirely justified by the
second moral power; others largely justified by the first moral power;
and still others justified instrumentally. 54 I submit that a more plausi51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at
Id at
Id.at
Id. at

332-63.
299.
309.
332-33.
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ble view (at least at the constitutional stage) is that many of the core
liberties and rights can be justified by at least two of these approaches,
and sometimes by all three.
Consider the freedom to communicate with others through
speech, press, and other media. One direct argument is that the ability to engage in this sort of communication is a necessary part of almost any conception of the good; just as one would not risk letting the
majority decide whether one could follow one's deeply held religious
beliefs, one would not risk letting the majority decide whether one
could talk with others about religious and political issues. This is such
an important liberty one can reasonably regard it as nonnegotiable.
Another direct argument is that it would be impossible to develop or
exercise a capacity for a sense of justice if one could not communicate
with others (one could not receive information, for example, about
which problems of justice are most severe). There are also good indirect arguments for this liberty. Freedom to communicate provides a
very important way of exposing governmental corruption and abuse,
and hence is instrumental in preserving other liberties. Further, it is
essential to the political procedures that regulate the basic structure
(for example, one cannot gauge whether equal opportunity is available, or the difference principle satisfied, without talking to people
and hearing their frank perspectives and complaints). Table 2 offers a
view of which justifications apply to which rights.
If I am correct in suggesting that many liberties and rights can be
given direct and multiple justifications, then Rawls's constant reliance
on freedom of conscience as a paradigm or model case is avoidableand is particularly unnecessary in the constitutional stage where the
full range of justificatory arguments is available.
C.

The Budgeting Problem

Rawls never seems to worry that our social resources will be inadequate to provide for all of the basic liberties and rights-at least in
the "favorable" circumstances that we are now in. He does warn that
it is wise to "limit the basic liberties to those that are truly essential," 55
but he seems to think that if we do this we will have the human, financial, and institutional resources to provide at least for the "central
range of application" of all of the basic liberties,5 6 and thus have a
"fully adequate" system of basic liberties and rights. Let's say that the
55. Id. at 296.
56. Id at 297.
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TABLE 2-TYPE OF JUSTIFICATION

Necessary in the

Necessary to

Necessary to the
protection of

pursuit of a
good life

develop and apply
a sense of justice

other liberties
and rights

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

yes
yes
yes

association

yes

yes

yes

religious belief

yes

no

no

Liberty of the person
movement
residence
occupation
assembly
religious practice
privacy
marriage
family
personal property

yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes

yes
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
maybe

yes
no
maybe
yes
no
yes
no
no
maybe

Political liberties

no*

yes

yes

Equality rights

no*

yes

yes

Security rights
Due process rights

no*

yes

yes

no*

yes

yes

Liberty of mind
thought
inquiry
communication

The answer here may be affirmative if we think that having equal rights in these areas is
necessary to self-respect. If we take this view, then every basic liberty and right is necessary to
the pursuit of a good life.
*

"budgeting problem" is the problem of having more essential primary
goods in the area of liberty and rights than we can afford to provide
uncompromising protections for. If there is a budgeting problem in
the area of basic liberties and rights, then we will not be able to go
straight from the recognition of a liberty or right as a primary good to
bringing its core under the very stringent demands of the first principle-as Rawls seems to do. Additional steps that screen out some
claims to liberties or rights based on primary goods will be needed.
Budgeting may be thought to be impermissible because it requires us to deny protections that are morally imperative. But there is
at least one approach to budgeting that is not open to this objection.
It involves putting another step into the process of justifying a basic
liberty or right. This step requires showing that what I earlier described as "structural protections" are not sufficiently strong protections of this liberty given the nature and level of the threats to its
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enjoyment. Once we recognize that not all valuable liberties can be
included in the list of basic liberties, and that these excluded liberties
can nevertheless be given important structural protections, we see that
there is available at the constitutional stage a way of fitting the list5 7of
basic liberties and rights to a country's resources and capabilities.

IV.

ELABORATING AND ADJUSTING THE BASIC LIBERTIES

In formulating a constitutional bill of rights it may be appropriate
to prescribe "freedom of speech" or "freedom of movement" in the
abstract. But when one reaches the legislative and application stages,
the meaning of these abstract liberties has to be made clearer, and
whether the system of liberties and rights as a whole is "fully adequate" will have to be assessed.
Some areas of speech and movement will be more important liberties than others, and some forms of speech and movement may justifiably be forbidden. Further, the basic liberties and rights will
sometimes conflict with each other, and will need to have their boundaries adjusted to reduce such conflicts. As we saw earlier, Rawls uses
the familiar strategy of suggesting that the same ideas and procedures
that we used to justify the rights should also be used to interpret and
apply them.
To interpret freedom of speech or movement using this approach
we would ask why these freedoms are very important primary goods,
and that would lead us back to Rawls's conception of the person and
the two moral powers. For example, we might try to show that the
movements required to participate in a political rally or to go to the
polls to vote are extremely important to the exercise of the capacity
for a sense of justice (the first moral power). It will be very difficult or
impossible to exercise a sense of justice if one is under a sort of house
arrest, that is, forbidden to make the movements required to participate in politics. In contrast, we might find that being able to go to the
Grand Canyon for sightseeing is a much less important kind of movement since it is not required for the development or exercise of the
sense of justice. Rawls devotes an extended discussion to making
58
these sorts of distinctions in regard to speech of various kinds.
57. For a discussion of more radical means of reducing the costs of liberties and rights such
as cutting the number of rightholders, restricting weight and scope, and limiting the level of
enforcement or provision, see supra note 20, at 124-30.
58. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 340-63.
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Rawls introduces the idea of a "fundamental case" to assist in this
process of assessing the significance of particular areas of liberty.
Rawls's idea is that the most important areas of liberties can be identified by showing that they are central not just to the exercise of one of
the two moral powers, but to the application of one of those powers in
specific sub-areas that are clearly of great importance within the
Rawlsian theory of justice. For the first moral power, this especially
important area of activity is the application of the principles of justice
to the basic structure of society. "The equal political liberties and
freedom of thought are to secure the free and informed application of
the principles of justice, by means of the full and effective exercise of
the citizens' sense of justice, to the basic structure of society. '5 9 For
the second moral power, this especially important area of activity is
"forming, revising, and rationally pursuing a conception of the good
over a complete life." 6
Rawls then uses these ideas to define the importance of a liberty
or a particular area of that liberty:
[A] liberty is more or less significant depending on whether it is
more or less essentially involved in, or is a more or less necessary
institutional means to protect, the full and informed and effective
exercise of
the moral powers in one (or both) of the two fundamen61
tal cases.
I believe that the idea of the two fundamental cases is one of the least
successful of Rawls's recent innovations. First, the idea of focusing on
the core of the core, and hence of letting everything turn on a narrow
range of cases, is not plausible as a theoretical move in this area.
Some liberties and rights get their significance from their ubiquity,
from supporting an extremely wide range of valuable activities. This
is true, for example, of security rights, and of the freedom to communicate. If we focus on a very narrow area-as the fundamental case
approach suggests we should-the full significance of these sorts of
liberties and rights will be hidden.
59. Id. at 334-35. Since Rawls now allows that it would be a good idea to have a basic needs
principle that has priority over the basic liberties principle, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1,
at 7, the first fundamental case will now cover not just the application of the original principles
of justice, but will also include the application of the sense of justice-or perhaps a person's
moral and intellectual powers generally-to the question of what the basic needs are and
whether they are satisfied within the basic structure of one's country. The basic needs principle,
as I am calling it, is a recent addition that is not accommodated in The Basic Liberties and Their
Priority, id. at 289.
60. Id. at 335.
61. Id.
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Second, the test of the significance of a right that Rawls proposes
has implications that are not intuitively plausible. As Rawls defines
the first fundamental case, it excludes too much. For example, the use
of one's political liberties to learn about and to attempt to influence
the foreign policy of one's country seems to me to be just as important
or significant as the use of those liberties to deal with questions about
justice in the basic structure. But Rawls's test in terms of the first
fundamental case would clearly assign greater significance to the latter. I think that the same objection could be made about using one's
political liberties to deal with matters of environmental protection, or
matters of deep injustice in foreign countries. Since these do not concern the justice of the basic structure of a citizen's country, Rawls's
test implies that they are of lesser significance. I do not find that conclusion plausible.
If the first fundamental case is defined too narrowly, the second
fundamental case is defined too broadly. It "applies" the capacity to
form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good to the formation,
revision, and pursuit of a conception of the good over a complete life.
Thus the "fundamental case" is almost as broad as the capacity itself.
Few things fall outside this definition, and I cannot see that it does
much work not already done by testing the importance of rights by
reference to their role in protecting the development and application
of the second moral power.
What is needed here is some way of saying that some choices one
makes in pursuit of a good life are more important than others, and
hence more worthy of uncompromising protections. Rawls obviously
believes that the choice of one's religion, or of one's moral outlook, is
of greater importance than, say, the choice of one's favorite foods, but
he never gives an adequate explanation why-except to say that a
people who did not view their religious views as nonnegotiable would
not know what it was to hold a religious view. 62 One possibility here
is to give greatest importance to those choices that are all-permeating
in the sense that they generally affect most other choices within one's
life plan. I have in mind choices such as one's life-partner (if any),
one's occupation, one's location of residence, whether to have children, one's moral and political outlook, and one's religious or philosophical outlook. These all-permeating choices would serve better, I
believe, as test cases for the second moral power. If this approach
were followed, the most important liberties (and parts of liberties)
62. Id. at 311.
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would be those that are necessary to making these all-permeating
choices. For example, those parts of freedom of association (or inquiry or movement) that are requisite to choosing a mate, preparing
for and finding an occupation, and developing and exercising one's
moral, political, philosophical, and religious views would be more significant, on this test, than those that are requisite, say, to finding companions for recreational activities or to organizing a neighborhood
food coop (assuming, of course, that food was available in other
ways).
Rawls's development of the idea of having a fundamental case for
each moral power is largely unsuccessful. From the first fundamental
case one is guided to take the political liberties very seriously when
they are applied to questions of justice, but this is a conclusion that
can be reached easily in a wide number of ways within the Rawlsian
framework. Further, this approach underestimates, in my opinion, the
significance of political speech about matters other than justice in

one's own country. The second fundamental case seems to be just a
showcase item. It provides little guidance since it is almost as broad as
the second moral power itself, and it is never actually put to use by

Rawls in interpreting particular liberties or rights.
V.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE

Two

MORAL POWERS

Most of the recent changes in Rawls's theory of liberty revolve
around the political conception of the person that identifies two moral
powers as fundamental. The addition of this conception of the person
has helped to make Rawls's theory less formal and more substantive,
and thus to provide a more adequate basis for justifying and interpreting basic liberties and rights. But is it not possible, even likely, that
there are more than two key areas of human activity that we should
use in justifying and interpreting a system of liberties and rights? After all, humans are not merely pursuers of the good and citizens concerned with justice. They are also typically workers, householders,
and members of families. 63 Do not these areas of activity have an
important place in a system of social cooperation?
To put the same question in a different way, is Rawls's political
conception of the person arbitrarily selective even within his own
framework in what it endorses as fundamental? If there are other
63. Susan Moller Okin argues that Rawls should abandon his "traditional liberal assumpSUSAN
tions about public versus domestic, political versus nonpolitical spheres of life .
MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 109 (1989).
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human capacities with associated areas of activity that are equally presupposed by the idea of cooperation for mutual advantage, 64 this
would affect the shape and priority of the basic liberties and rights. 65
As a specific illustration of this possibility, I submit that the capacity
to produce social benefits through one's actions (roughly the capacity
to work, where work is not restricted to formal employment) should
be regarded as a third moral power because it is presupposed by
Rawls's root idea of cooperation for mutual advantage.
It is not plausible to respond to the suspicion that there may be
other fundamental moral powers with a (typically Rawlsian) suggestion that in order to keep things simple and manageable we should
limit the moral powers to just two. Too much turns on this matter to
allow it to be decided by matters of theoretical convenience. If we
take the capacity to engage in productive activity as a fundamental
moral power, this will have important implications for how we justify
and interpret rights and liberties. 66 For example, it will boost the priority of economic liberties and rights when they conflict with other
67
sorts of rights.
Rawls defends the two moral powers by arguing that they are
implicit in his root idea of social cooperation for mutual benefit. 68
The capacity to produce social benefits through one's productive activities can be defended in exactly the same way. Social cooperation
will not produce most of the kinds of benefits that give rise to questions of distributive justice unless people work. Persons who are capable of being "normal and fully cooperating members of society over a
complete life" 69 must be persons who are capable of producing benefits for society through their deliberate actions. If we view persons as
capable of social cooperation for mutual benefit, we are attributing to
them not just a capacity to develop and exercise a sense of justice, and
to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good, but also a capacity to benefit themselves and others through their productive activi64. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 300.

65. Notice that in raising this question in this way, I am continuing (for the purposes of this
Article) to presuppose Rawls's framework and starting point. I believe that there are also
problems of arbitrary selectivity in taking social cooperation for mutual advantage as one's only
starting point, but that is not my present concern.
66. Recognizing productive action as a third moral power does not entail some sort of duty
to work. Its role, like that of the two moral powers Rawls introduces, is to orient our conception
of primary goods and ultimately our conception of justice-including our conception of basic
liberties and fights. Like the other key capacities, the capacity to work is to be protected in its
development and exercise.
67. For a defense of some economic rights as human rights, see supra note 20, at 147-70.
68. POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 1, at 300.

69. Id. at 301.
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ties. This third capacity is certainly presupposed, for example, by the
difference principle.
Rawls recognizes that a conception of the person as "homo
faber" is a traditional way of identifying certain aspects of human nature as particularly significant. But he dismisses this conception as a
personal or moral ideal rather than as one presupposed by his root
idea of social cooperation for mutual advantage. 70 I believe that he is
wrong about this.
Because of the very important role that the politicai conception
of the person plays in shaping a system of rights and liberties, the
question of whether other human capacities and areas of action can be
rooted in exactly the same way in the idea of social cooperation for
mutual advantage needs to be very carefully explored. It is not clear
that Rawls has conducted a serious exploration of this sort. We have
reason to worry that the entire structure that Rawls has constructed in
recent years for justifying and interpreting liberties and rights is arbitrarily narrow.

70. Id. at 300.

